Field Guide 03 · Choosing a private phone
There is no untrackable phone. There is a set of trade-offs.
The right phone depends on who is looking for you and what it would cost you to be found. Every choice trades among four things that pull against each other: privacy, anonymity, security, and whether you will actually live with the result. The options at the far end of the anonymity scale exist. They also demand a discipline that very few people can sustain, and this guide is honest about that.
01 · Where we stand
Your phone is a tracking device that also makes calls.
This is not a flaw. It is how the network works. To ring when someone calls you, a phone has to stay registered with the network. The operator can associate its subscriber identity (on the SIM or eSIM), its handset identifier (the IMEI), and its network activity with locations over time. The network uses temporary identifiers on the air, but the operator can still tie them back to you. Everything else, the apps, the advertising identifiers, the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth chatter, the accounts you sign into, is layered on top of a device that announces its presence by design.
So the question is never "How do I get an untrackable phone?" There is no such object. The useful questions are: tracked by whom, linked to what, at what cost to you if the link is made, and what are you willing to give up to break it. Most people asking about private phones are not being hunted by a government. They are being profiled by advertisers, located by data brokers, and exposed to whoever buys the result. That problem has a good, livable answer. The other problem, the one where a well-resourced adversary is specifically looking for you, has an answer too. It is just much more expensive than a phone.
What this guide replaces
Our earlier material ran to three separate documents and an eighteen-row comparison matrix. Most of it was accurate. Too little of it helped a reader decide. This edition keeps the decision. Setting up a phone and buying a used one now have their own companion guides; carrier names, retailer tips, and anonymous-acquisition methods date in months and belong with an analyst, not on a public page.
Privacy protects your data from being harvested. Anonymity protects your identity from being linked to the device. A private phone is not necessarily an anonymous one, and the reverse is also true.
02 · The axes
Four axes, not one.
Most phone advice ranks devices on a single line from "tracked" to "private." That line does not exist. Two examples make the point.
A Pixel running GrapheneOS is the strongest privacy and security device most people can buy: no Google services unless you add them, reduced operating-system telemetry, a hardened operating system, sandboxed apps. Buy it with your credit card, activate it on your home Wi-Fi, and use it for your normal life, and its anonymity is roughly zero. It is an excellent private phone that is entirely yours.
A cheap prepaid handset bought for cash far from home has high anonymity potential on the day you buy it. It also runs stock software that reports to its manufacturer, its carrier, and every app on it, usually stops getting security updates early, and loses its anonymity the first time you carry it home. It is an anonymous phone that leaks like a sieve, until it is neither.
| Axis | What raises it | What it costs you |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy | A hardened operating system, few apps, permissions cut to the bone, ad tracking shut off, radios off when not needed, little or no cloud sync. | Convenience. Some apps will not run. Some features vanish. |
| Anonymity | No purchase record, no account, no activation near your life, no contact with people who know you, no pattern, no co-location with your real phone. | Nearly everything you use a phone for. This axis is bought with behavior, not hardware. |
| Security | Current hardware and software, verified boot, a long passcode, a vendor that patches fast, hardening modes such as Lockdown Mode or Android Advanced Protection. | Usually the cheapest axis. Its enemy is old hardware that no longer gets updates. |
| Usability | Mainstream hardware, mainstream software, your accounts, your contacts, your maps. | The other three axes. |
Fig. 2 Security and privacy can be raised together with the right device. Anonymity is different in kind. It is not a property of the phone; it is a property of every interaction the phone has ever had.
03 · Threat
Who is looking decides which phone.
Before choosing a device, name the adversary. These are different capabilities, not rungs on one ladder. A government investigator may have carrier records and no spyware. An abusive partner may have no legal process and the passcode. A commercial investigator may hold datasets a particular agency never obtained. The phone that answers one of these can do little against another, so choose for the adversary you actually have, and for more than one if your life calls for it.
| Who is looking | Primary capability | Most useful defense |
|---|---|---|
| Advertisers and data brokers | Collection and identity resolution: advertising identifiers, app location data, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth proximity, whatever apps report, bought and sold, then joined to your name through other records. | Minimize collection and outside exposure: ad tracking off, disciplined permissions, broker removal. This is the problem most people actually have, and it is solvable. |
| A personal adversary | Account access, relationships, and physical proximity: people-search sites, social media, a shared account, location sharing left on, a tracker in a bag or car, a known passcode, a phone left unlocked. | Account security, a passcode they do not know, a location-sharing check, a tracker sweep, and the exposure reduction that keeps your number and address out of circulation. |
| A professional investigator or hostile researcher | Correlation and attribution: commercial location data, breach data, phone-number lookups, and pattern analysis across your accounts and your family's. | Separation of identities, accounts, and activities: a compartment device for the sensitive matter, plus monitoring for the moment your number surfaces where it should not. |
| Law enforcement with legal process | Legal process and forensics: carrier records, tower dumps, subscriber and device histories, account and notification-token records from platforms, and extraction of any phone they can hold. | Data minimization, device security at rest, and counsel. Lawful process reaches carrier and platform records regardless of your handset. |
| An intelligence service or its proxies | Advanced collection and exploitation: bulk and targeted collection without your consent or a warrant, correlation at scale, and zero-click exploits against the phone itself. | Layered hardening (Lockdown Mode or GrapheneOS), compartmentation, and a specialist threat assessment. No purchase answers this row alone. |
Fig. 3 Five adversaries, five different capabilities. Most people face the first three. The last two are where "untrackable" advice comes from, and where it mostly fails.
04 · Attribution
How a phone gets traced to its owner.
This section is here not because someone is watching you, but because the myth of the anonymous burner is the most expensive misunderstanding in this field. People buy a phone for cash, feel invisible, and then use it in the one way that identifies them. Knowing how attribution works tells you what "anonymous" would really require, and lets you decide whether you need it at all.
Anonymity is not a state you achieve once. It is a relationship between the evidence an adversary can collect and the identity they are trying to establish. Each link below raises the probability of attribution. A single strong link may be enough. Several weak ones can become decisive when combined. When law enforcement or a state is involved, the evidence is usually there to find.
- 01 The purchase
Carrier stores, and phone shops that sell and activate in the same visit, record the handset's IMEI or serial number against the sale. Cameras cover the counter and the parking lot. A card payment names you outright; cash narrows it to the footage and whatever else you carried into the store, including your real phone.
- 02 The activation
The first time the phone connects, the network records which tower it used, when, and which handset identifier is paired with which subscriber identifier. Activate it near the store and the record points back to the store. In a 2014 Washington State courthouse bomb-threat case, phone records showed a prepaid phone had been activated near a Walmart, and the store's cameras showed who bought it.
- 03 The company it keeps
If your real phone and the "anonymous" one travel together, they light up the same towers at the same times. Co-travel is not proof of common ownership, but repeated over days it is strong evidence, and it is the most common way a burner fails. It can start the first day.
- 04 The pattern
A phone that sleeps where you sleep and works where you work is you, whatever name is on the account. Carrier records over weeks make the home tower obvious. No content is required.
- 05 The people
Who you call and message, and how often, is a fingerprint. A new number that contacts your spouse, your assistant, and your lawyer is your number. Encrypted apps protect what you said, not the fact that you said it to them.
- 06 The accounts
One sign-in to an existing email, app store, cloud, or social account joins the device to your identity. So does restoring a backup, or a Wi-Fi network the phone remembers. Apps that receive notifications register the device with Apple or Google, and those registrations can be requested with legal process.
- 07 The seizure
A phone in someone's hands is a different problem. Forensic tools used by agencies, and sold to private examiners and companies as well, extract far more than the screen shows. Protection at rest is set up in advance: a long passcode, biometrics off where seizure is plausible, current software. Know the difference between unlocked, locked, and restarted-and-not-yet-unlocked; the last is the hardest to extract from. Recent iPhones restart themselves after three days locked, though one forensic vendor now claims it can preserve the earlier state if it reaches the phone first. Results vary by device, software version, and tool. If a search or seizure is anticipated, get legal advice beforehand; once one is under way, do not interfere with it.
What this means for you
Full anonymity means keeping all seven links weak at once, every day, for as long as the phone exists. One mistake may not identify you; it raises the odds, and mistakes accumulate. Sustained anonymity is possible. It is also a second, deliberately impoverished life, and the phone that lives it cannot be the phone you actually use. For nearly everyone, the right response to this section is not to attempt it. It is to be realistic about which rows of Fig. 3 you are in, and to buy the phone for those.
What a private phone cannot fix
The phone is one node in a larger graph. A principal can carry an exceptionally private phone and still be found through records that have nothing to do with its operating system: the carrier subscription and its billing address, the accounts the number is attached to, the payments, the family plan, the people-search profile that lists the number, and the commercial datasets that already joined it to a home. Changing the handset does not break those links. Some can be deleted. Some can be reduced or separated. Some have to be treated as permanent and managed.
Protect the number, not just the phone
Your mobile number is both an identifier and, for many services, an account recovery mechanism. A compromised carrier account can allow an attacker to transfer your number or take control of your cellular service without compromising the handset. Enable available carrier account locks, SIM-swap and port-out protections. Replace SMS authentication with stronger methods wherever possible. Review which important accounts can still be recovered through your number.
| Delete | Reduce or separate | Treat as persistent |
|---|---|---|
| People-search listings and broker records that tie the number to your name and address, where a removal right or process exists. | The number itself (a separate number for public use), the accounts it unlocks, family-plan and billing links, shared devices. | Carrier and platform records already created, records held under legal obligation, copies already sold onward. |
Fig. 4 The intervention model for the records around a phone. Device hardening changes none of these columns.
A private phone can reduce what the device reveals. It cannot erase what the world already knows about its owner.
05 · Postures
Four postures, instead of eighteen phones.
Our old matrix scored eighteen devices on six criteria. Several no longer exist, several were never buyable by a normal person, and the scores implied a precision the subject does not have. What matters is which of four postures you are adopting. The hardware follows from that.
Posture 01 · Most people
Your own phone, hardened
A supported iPhone or Pixel on current software, with a long passcode, strong account authentication, permissions cut back, ad tracking shut off (on Android, delete the advertising ID, copying it first if you plan to send opt-out requests; on iPhone, turn off Allow Apps to Request to Track and revoke apps already allowed), analytics off, cloud sync trimmed, and location sharing checked. Signal for anything sensitive. Add Lockdown Mode or Android Advanced Protection if you are a likely target, such as a public figure, principal, or journalist; both restrict ordinary features, and Apple describes Lockdown Mode as extreme protection for a small number of people. Your number, your accounts, your life.
Buys. Strong security, materially better privacy, full usability. Does not buy. Any anonymity. Answers the first two rows of Fig. 3.
Posture 02 · Elevated privacy
A privacy phone, still yours
A Pixel running GrapheneOS, installed yourself with the project's web installer, or a de-Googled alternative if you accept a security step down. No Google account, reduced telemetry, a hardened OS. It can still carry your number and your identity, and the network and any apps you add still report what they report.
Buys. The strongest privacy and security a private buyer can get today. Does not buy. Anonymity, and some app compatibility. Answers rows one through three.
Posture 03 · Compartment
A second phone for one purpose
A separate device, ideally a hardened one, set up with care and used for a single sensitive purpose: a source relationship, a legal matter, a period of heightened risk. Its purpose is separation, not anonymity. It is still traceable to you with effort. It is kept apart from your everyday accounts, contacts, and locations so that a compromise of one does not reach the other.
Buys. Compartmentation and a smaller blast radius. Does not buy. Anonymity against a serious adversary. Answers row three; softens row four.
Posture 04 · Extreme threat
High-anonymity protocol
A device with no purchase, activation, location, contact, or account link to you, maintained that way indefinitely. This is what the old guides described. Every lapse raises the odds of attribution, and lapses compound. The procedure is not published here, and no one should attempt it alone.
Buys. May reduce attribution risk, subject to operational discipline. Costs. Almost all usability, and a permanent operational burden. See section 06.
| Posture | Privacy | Anonymity | Security | Usability | Ongoing effort |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Own phone, hardened | Good | None | Strong | Full | An afternoon, then updates |
| Privacy phone | Highest of the four | None to low | Highest of the four | Good, with gaps | A weekend, then updates |
| Compartment phone | Good to high | Low (it separates; it does not hide) | Strong | Narrow by design | Constant separation discipline |
| High-anonymity protocol | Depends on hardware | Reduced attribution risk, if the discipline holds | Often weak | Minimal | A second life |
Fig. 5 The postures, scored as assessments that will move as devices and software change. The anonymous phone often has the worst security: the handsets that can be bought without a trace are rarely the ones that can be hardened.
06 · The price
What full anonymity actually costs.
This is not a walkthrough. It is a description of what is involved, so that the decision is made with open eyes. A phone that is anonymous against a capable adversary has to stay separate from you on five fronts at once, for its whole life:
- Identity. Nothing about how it was obtained or paid for leads back to you, and the hardware that allows that is rarely the hardware that can be hardened.
- Service. The number, the accounts, and any payments made for them are new, and never touched from anything you already own.
- Location. It never sleeps, works, or travels where you do, and never rides next to your real phone.
- Communications. It never contacts anyone who already knows you.
- Usage over time. It is rotated before patterns form and retired on purpose, because a phone that drifts into ordinary use links everything it ever did to you, retroactively.
Read that list as a description of a life. You cannot take the phone home. You cannot call your family on it. You cannot check your email. You cannot charge it in your car. You cannot use it in the same coffee shop twice. Journalists protecting sources and people under credible threat do live this way for the duration of a specific need, with support, and they still make mistakes.
The phone can be read as intent
Owning a second phone is lawful. It can still be used against you. In the Georgia racketeering case against protesters opposing Atlanta's police training center, a coalition of 25 rights and press-freedom groups wrote to the state attorney general in February 2024 objecting that prosecutors had treated a defendant's "burner" phone as evidence of criminal intent. The racketeering counts against all 61 defendants were dismissed on procedural grounds in September 2025, and the state said it would appeal. The argument had already been made in court. A tool bought to protect you can, in the wrong context, be presented as the thing that shows what you meant to do.
07 · Landscape
The devices that matter in 2026, and the ones that no longer do.
The February 2025 matrix listed eighteen options. Most of that field has consolidated, and several entries were never realistic for a private buyer. What to know now:
The reference: a Pixel running GrapheneOS
Still the strongest combination of privacy and security available to an individual. Still Pixel-only today, including the Pixel 10 series, which GrapheneOS began supporting in late 2025. GrapheneOS and Motorola announced a partnership in March 2026, with the first supported Motorola phones expected in 2027. Some vendors sell Pixels with GrapheneOS already installed. GrapheneOS does not endorse any of them and recommends buying a supported Pixel and installing it yourself. If you do buy one preinstalled, check the verified-boot key against the value GrapheneOS publishes, confirm it with the Auditor app, and factory reset before use.
The ground under this choice is moving. Google stopped publishing full Pixel device trees in 2025, put Pixel kernel source behind a request form in August 2026, and in September 2026 shipped some platform fixes to Pixels months before they reached the open-source code other phone makers use. GrapheneOS has kept up so far, but whether future Pixels will be supported is unsettled. Treat the Motorola path as the hedge, not yet the answer.
The mainstream alternative: an iPhone in Lockdown Mode
Apple's security is excellent, and Lockdown Mode meaningfully raises the cost of the exploits used against high-value targets. In March 2026 Apple said it was not aware of any successful mercenary spyware attack against a device in Lockdown Mode; Citizen Lab has documented cases where it blocked Pegasus and Predator. The iPhone 17 generation adds hardware memory protections aimed at the same class of attack. Anonymity is the weak axis. An iPhone can be set up without signing in to an Apple Account, though the App Store, iCloud and other services require one, and U.S. models have been eSIM-only since the iPhone 14 in 2022, which complicates the cash-and-SIM approach older guides assumed. For someone who lives in Apple's world and is not trying to be anonymous, this is the right answer.
Stock Android, hardened: Advanced Protection
Android 16 added Advanced Protection, a single switch that turns on theft and USB protections, blocks sideloaded apps, blocks 2G connections, stops automatic reconnection to insecure networks, and hardens Chrome. On a current Pixel, or another Android 16 phone that offers it, it is the nearest Android counterpart to Lockdown Mode, though the two restrict different things. Like Lockdown Mode, it belongs on the phones of people who are likely targets. It does not change what Google services collect.
The de-Googled middle
Vendors selling pre-configured de-Googled Android phones offer real privacy gains over stock with less setup than GrapheneOS, at some cost in security rigor and with the anonymity hit of an online purchase. CalyxOS, which our old guide recommended for budget buyers, paused security updates in August 2025 after a leadership change and advised users to switch away. It returned in July 2026, has shipped monthly security releases since, and began its Android 17 rollout in October 2026. Anyone who followed the old advice spent most of a year on an unpatched phone. The lesson is not that CalyxOS is unusable today; it is that a small project's continuity is a risk you carry, so watch its release cadence before relying on it.
Feature phones
A minimalist phone with no app store leaks far less than a smartphone and is easy to buy. It is still a carrier-tracked radio with the same permanent identifiers, and its security is usually poor. Good for reducing the app problem; irrelevant to the network problem.
Dropped from the list
Enterprise and government secure handsets that are procured, not bought at retail. Boutique "ultra-secure" phones that were discontinued or never shipped in quantity. Linux phones that remain hobbyist hardware. Modified iPhones from third parties whose modifications cannot be audited. None of these is wrong to own. None belongs in a guide for people making a decision.
08 · Common beliefs
Common beliefs, checked.
"A burner phone is anonymous."
A burner is a phone with no name on the account. Its owner is identified by the purchase, the activation, the towers it shares with your real phone, the places it sleeps, the people it calls, and the accounts it touches. In our experience, a burner used in an ordinary way is linked to its owner quickly.
"Cash makes the purchase untraceable."
Cash removes one record. A store that activates the phone ties its IMEI to the sale, the store still has cameras, and the phone in your pocket still logged you at the nearest tower when you walked in.
"The most secure phone is the most private phone."
Different axes. Security is resistance to intrusion. Privacy is what leaks by design. An iPhone in Lockdown Mode is extremely secure and still reports to Apple. A cash feature phone is hard to link to you and easy to break into.
"A VPN hides my phone."
A VPN hides your traffic from the network you are on. It does nothing about the cellular identifiers, the tower records, the apps reporting through it, or the account you paid for it with. A useful layer, a poor foundation.
"Signal makes the phone private."
Signal protects content and keeps very little about who talks to whom. It does not hide that a device exists or where it is, and a seized, unlocked phone shows the whole conversation. Encrypted content on an attributed phone is still an attributed phone.
"Older phones track less."
Older phones patch less. Our earlier guide said to buy a model a few years old. An unsupported handset is the easiest thing on this page to compromise, and its radios report exactly what a new one does. Buy current hardware and remove the tracking in software.
"Airplane mode, or powering off, makes it invisible."
Powering down stops ordinary cellular reporting. Some devices keep limited find-my features alive, and the records right before shutdown and right after restart still place you. Airplane mode is a software promise; check the radios in settings.
"A Faraday bag solves it."
A working, closed, correctly rated Faraday bag blocks radio while the phone is inside it. It does nothing about the records made before it went in and after it comes out, and an untested bag is a hope, not a control.
"A factory reset removes everything."
A reset clears the handset. The carrier's records, the platform's records, the store's records, and the device identifiers themselves are untouched. The phone forgets. The network does not.
09 · The one-minute version
Three threat levels, three answers.
- Name who is looking before you buy anything; most people need a hardened version of the phone they already own.
- Keep it supported and updated, use a long passcode and strong account authentication; add Lockdown Mode or Advanced Protection if you are a likely target.
- Protect the number: turn on your carrier's account lock and SIM-swap and port-out protection, and move important accounts off SMS recovery.
- Shut off ad tracking (delete the ID on Android; turn off tracking requests on iPhone), cut permissions, check location sharing, and trim cloud sync.
- For a sensitive matter, use a separate compartment phone kept apart from your accounts, contacts, and routine.
- Do not build a high-anonymity phone from a guide; it is a protocol with a lifespan, not a device.
Most people · Posture 01
- Keep your current iPhone or Pixel. Update it.
- Long passcode. Biometrics off if seizure is plausible.
- Strong account authentication on every account.
- Carrier account lock, SIM-swap and port-out protection on. No SMS recovery where a stronger option exists.
- Ad tracking off. Cut permissions. Trim cloud sync.
- Signal for anything sensitive.
- Get your number and address out of the broker ecosystem.
Elevated · Postures 02 and 03
- Turn on Lockdown Mode or Advanced Protection, or move to a Pixel running GrapheneOS.
- Consider a compartment phone for the sensitive matter.
- Sweep vehicles and bags for trackers.
- Watch for your number appearing where it should not.
- Brief family and staff. They are how compartments leak.
Extreme · Posture 04
- Do not build a high-anonymity phone from a guide, including this one.
- Expect to give up home use, family contact, and every existing account on it.
- Plan its retirement before its purchase.
- Pair it with counsel if legal exposure is part of the picture.
- Run it with an analyst on call.
The standard
Buy the phone for the adversary you actually have. Harden it as far as your life allows. Treat anonymity as a discipline you adopt for a specific purpose and a specific period, not a feature you purchase. And remember that most of what identifies you is not in the phone at all. It is in the records that surround it.
10 · Sources
Sources and related reading.
Reviewed against current first-party and independent material in October 2026. Devices, operating systems, and vendor policies in this space change in months, and small projects can pause without warning. Confirm the status of any product before relying on it. Nothing here is legal advice, and nothing here is intended to defeat lawful process.
Cases and law
- ABA Journal, Courthouse bomb-threat charges result from Wal-Mart surveillance footage of cellphone purchase, 3 April 2014: activation records placed the prepaid phone near the store; store cameras identified the buyer.
- Freedom of the Press Foundation, Rights orgs to Georgia AG: stop criminalizing dissent and privacy, 12 February 2024 (coalition of 25 groups incl. the National Lawyers Guild).
- Reason, Judge dismisses RICO charges against all Cop City defendants, 9 September 2025.
- Riley v. California (2014): a warrant is generally required to search a seized phone. Carpenter v. United States (2018): historical cell-site records are protected by the warrant requirement.
Vendor, platform, and project statements
- Apple, Set up your iPhone or iPad (an Apple Account can be set up later, in Settings).
- Apple, About Lockdown Mode (extreme, optional protection for a small number of people); Apple's March 2026 statement as reported by MacRumors, 27 March 2026 (from TechCrunch).
- Apple Security Research, Memory Integrity Enforcement, September 2025, as reported by SecurityWeek.
- Google, Android 16 Advanced Protection, June 2025, as reported by 9to5Google, 4 June 2025.
- The Register, Motorola partners with GrapheneOS for future phones, 2 March 2026.
- Privacy Guides, GrapheneOS now has experimental support for Pixel 10 series, 26 November 2025.
- Android Authority, Pixel device trees and the future of GrapheneOS, 24 October 2025; Open Source For You, Google makes Pixel kernel source harder to access, August 2026; It's FOSS, GrapheneOS and Android 17 QPR1, 18 September 2026.
- 9to5Mac, GrayKey maker can reportedly bypass the iPhone's Inactivity Reboot, 1 October 2026 (after 404 Media; vendor claim, method not public).
- CalyxOS, project news: August 2025 hiatus, 1 July 2026 return (7.2.2.0), monthly security releases August to September 2026, Android 17 rollout from 1 October 2026.
- GrapheneOS, web installer and published verified-boot key hashes; Swappa, How to verify preinstalled GrapheneOS, 7 October 2026 (GrapheneOS does not endorse resellers).
Civil society and independent research
- Electronic Frontier Foundation, Surveillance Self-Defense, The Problem with Mobile Phones.
- Citizen Lab, University of Toronto: the research record on mercenary spyware, including BLASTPASS (September 2023), and cases where Lockdown Mode blocked Pegasus and Predator.
- Amnesty International Security Lab, Mobile Verification Toolkit.
- Upturn, Mass Extraction (2020): the reach of mobile device forensic tools in U.S. law enforcement.
- Freedom of the Press Foundation, digital security guides: compartmentation practice for people who protect sources.
This guide supersedes ObscureIQ's earlier phone-selection guidance: the retired 2025 editions of "Ultimate Guide to an Untrackable Phone," "How to Set Up a Phone That Can't Be Tracked," and "How to Buy a Used Phone for Privacy," the February 2025 eighteen-device comparison matrix, and the September 2026 edition of this guide. Practical configuration and acquisition guidance is maintained separately in Configuring and Maintaining a Private Phone and Buying a Used Phone for Privacy (November 2026). Revised 3 November 2026 (r3). Carrier, retailer, and service recommendations were removed; they date fast and belong in an engagement, not a public page.
Tell us who is looking. We will tell you which phone.
Most people need a hardened version of the phone they already own and a serious reduction of the records around it. A few need a compartment. Very few need the full protocol, and for those it is done with an analyst, not from a checklist. A confidential call establishes which of those you are.