Field Guide 05 · Be location safe
The data that follows you for ads can find you at a real address.
Location is not a privacy nuisance. It is targeting data. Turning off a setting no longer turns off the exposure, because the record was built, sold, and resold long before you reached for the switch. Getting location safe means doing two things at once: stop leaking your position, and clean up the trail you have already spilled. Work the tiers in order until you reach your own threat level.
All three converge on the same person, address, and routine. Cutting one path leaves the other two.
Contents
01 · Why now
Why this matters in 2026.
Two things happened this year that settle whether commercial location data is a real-world risk or a theoretical one.
In April, U.S. Central Command told Congress in written answers that it had received multiple threat reports of adversaries exploiting commercial location data to target or surveil U.S. personnel in its region. The same answers said personalized advertising was switched off on government phones but ad targeting information was not, and conceded that disabling geolocation on commercial products does not always fully disable it. Fourteen members of Congress made the answers public on 28 May. By August the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Command said they now disable the advertising ID on managed devices, and in September the same lawmakers asked the Defense Department's inspector general to test whether personal phones explain the location data still for sale. The mechanics are the same on an ordinary phone. What differs is who is buying.
In June, the Supreme Court decided Chatrie v. United States, 6 to 3. It held that police who acquire a person's Google Location History conduct a Fourth Amendment search, because people keep a reasonable expectation of privacy in detailed records of their movements even when a company holds them. Whether the warrant in that case was valid went back to the lower courts. Be precise about what that gives you. The ruling governs government access. It does not regulate brokers, create a right to sue one, or stop collection, and it did not decide whether an agency may simply buy similar records from a broker instead.
What it does give you is a better argument. The Court declined to treat tapping through a permission screen as handing over a detailed record of your movements, and that reasoning cuts against the industry's standard answer: you agreed. Regulators can cite it, and so can you. When a broker says you consented, ask it to show that consent, and aim the deletion demand at the consent it cannot prove. The reasoning is persuasive in a commercial dispute, not binding. It is still worth using.
The durable risk is not that you are tracked today. It is that your movement pattern is already an asset someone else owns.
02 · Sources of leakage
Where your location leaks from.
Most people think of location as one thing controlled by one switch. It is ten things, and the switch controls one of them. Every row below is a separate emitter with its own control, and most of them keep working when Location Services is off.
| Emitter | How it leaks | Who ends up with it |
|---|---|---|
| Sharing, accounts, and trackers | Location shared through Find My, Google Maps, or a family app; an account someone else can sign in to; a tracker in a bag or car. Location sharing keeps working with location history turned off. | Specific people, in real time. Often someone you know. |
| App permissions | Apps with "Always" or "While Using" access log precise position. Large platforms and utility apps are the heaviest collectors. | The app, its ad partners, its data partners. |
| Advertising ID and the bidstream | Ad requests can carry your ad ID and approximate location to every bidder in the auction, and losing bidders can keep what they saw. No setting switches the auction off. | Ad-tech intermediaries and the brokers that buy from them. |
| Operating-system history | Google Timeline and Apple Significant Locations record where you go and how often. | Held on the device or by the platform; reachable by lawful process. |
| The network itself | Cell towers, Wi-Fi scanning, Bluetooth beacons, cell-site simulators. Present whenever the radios are on. | Carriers, venue analytics firms, law enforcement. |
| Web traffic | IP address geolocation, browser fingerprinting, cross-site tracking. | Ad networks, analytics firms, anyone reading the logs. |
| Your vehicle | Connected cars can report position to the automaker. License plate readers record every pass, and no setting turns them off. | Automakers and their data partners; plate-reader networks and their customers. |
| Your face | Facial recognition at airports and borders, in some stores and venues, and run by police on footage and photos. | Camera operators and the matching services behind them. |
| Assistants and devices at home | Watches, speakers, TVs, thermostats, and the router itself hold location and usage history clustered around one address. | The device makers and whoever they share with. |
| Photos and posts | Photo metadata, background clues, and text that says where you are. | Anyone who can see the post, and anyone who scrapes it. |
Fig. 2 Ten emitters. Location Services controls the second row and part of the fourth. The first row is the one people check last and an adversary who knows you tries first. The bidstream and the plate readers are the two that most reliably put a name at an address for a stranger.
03 · The adversary's view
What someone needs to find you.
Reducing the amount of location data about you is not the same as reducing someone's ability to locate you. Someone looking for a person needs three different things, and each one comes from different records.
Find
A likely home, workplace, school, or current position. One exposed address or one live share is enough to give someone a lead.
Confirm
Evidence that you are actually tied to that place: a car in the driveway, a post from the porch, a second record that agrees with the first.
Predict
Enough history or repeated sightings to know where you will be next: the gym on Tuesdays, the school run, the route home.
This changes how you judge a control. Removing a broker listing can stop someone from finding the house and do nothing to stop a plate reader from confirming it. Switching off the ad ID can break one long-term movement record and leave a shared location untouched. The goal is to cut each path an adversary could use, starting with the ones closest to your actual threat.
Three outcomes a cleanup can reach
- Removal: the record is deleted where it is held. Ask for confirmation. A request is not proof of deletion.
- Suppression: the record stops appearing in search results or listings, but may still exist.
- Making it less useful: the record stays, like a property deed, but the other records that tie it to you are cut. FG-02 covers property.
04 · Baseline
What everyone should do.
Each tier has two columns and you work both. The left column stops the leak going forward. The right column cleans up what has already spilled. Do every tier up to your own, not just the one you land in.
Stop leaking location data
Start with the large platforms: social media, video, shopping, ride-hailing, and search apps. Set location to "Never" for anything that is not a map, and to "While Using" for maps. Turn off precise location for apps that only need your town.
The mobile ad ID is the key that joins your movements across unrelated apps, and the key brokers file them under. On Android, copy it, then delete it; apps asking for it then get zeros. On iPhone, turn off Allow Apps to Request to Track; reading the old ID first is optional, and you should not turn tracking on just to see it. FG-09 has the steps. Apps can still send coarse location, your IP address, and other identifiers with ad requests. The gain is that your records become much harder to join across apps and brokers.
Turn off location for the camera app, and strip location from photos before you share them.
Clean up what you have spilled
On iPhone, run Safety Check to review who you share location with and which devices are signed in to your account. On Android and in Google Maps, review Location Sharing. Check family and carrier locator apps, and any account you share with someone else. End anything you did not mean to keep.
Set Google's location history to delete automatically after 3, 18, or 36 months, so it stops accumulating indefinitely. On iPhone, review and clear Significant Locations.
05 · Elevated
You want the movement record cut, not just slowed.
Stop leaking location data
Airplane mode cuts cellular. Switch Wi-Fi and Bluetooth off in Settings as well: on an iPhone the Control Center buttons only disconnect them, and they reconnect by the next morning. The phone can still work out its position from GPS without transmitting, and apps or the system may store it. Use this for specific trips or meetings, not as a fix for data already flowing.
A reputable paid VPN hides your home or office IP address from the sites and apps you use, and a privacy-focused browser cuts cross-site tracking. That is one limited control. It does nothing about GPS, radios, the ad ID, accounts you sign in to, or the VPN company's own view of you.
Set a port-out PIN or number lock with your carrier yourself, and move two-factor codes off text messages to an authenticator app or passkey. The FCC adopted rules in 2023 requiring carriers to verify SIM changes and port-outs, but compliance has been on hold since July 2024, so do not assume your carrier does it. A device SIM PIN alone does not stop a carrier-side swap.
Clean up what you have spilled
Google ended cloud Timeline in June 2025. Timeline now lives on your phone, with an optional encrypted backup. Delete it on the device and delete the backup. Check Google's Web & App Activity too, which can hold places separately, and on iPhone clear Significant Locations.
Deleting history from your phone does not delete it from the brokers who already bought it. People-search opt-outs remove listings; they rarely reach the movement records that location brokers hold. If you live in California, one request through the state's Delete Request and Opt-out Platform (DROP) goes to every registered broker, and brokers must keep acting on it every 45 days; you do not need to resubmit, but add new identifiers when you have them. Elsewhere, use your state's deletion rights where they exist, or an authorized agent. Where a broker claims you consented, ask it to show the consent. Old advertising IDs help a broker find the records; FG-09 explains how to keep them.
Look up your car in a vehicle privacy report by its VIN to see what it collects and shares. In the car's settings and the automaker's app, turn off location sharing and connected services you do not use, and ask the automaker for a copy of your data and its deletion; since January 2026 the FTC requires General Motors to offer both. Wipe personal data before selling a car and after returning a rental. In one 2024 survey, about half of rental-car users said they had not deleted their phone data from the car.
Current-address deletion is the hard case, because new records keep arriving from property, utility, and delivery sources. Expect to repeat it.
06 · A known adversary
Someone specific is, or could be, looking for you.
This tier is decided by who is looking and what they can reach, not by how visible you are. A public figure with no credible threat may need less than a private person whose former partner knows their passwords, their car, and their friends. Use it when an individual has the intent and the access to look for you.
If the person looking for you is close to you
If an abusive partner or family member may be monitoring your phone, removing an app, ending a share, or resetting the phone can tip them off, and some escalate when they lose access. Make a safety plan first, from a device they cannot see, and keep evidence before you change anything. The National Domestic Violence Hotline (1-800-799-7233, or text START to 88788) can help you plan.
Stop leaking location data
Current iPhones and Android phones alert you when an unknown Bluetooth tracker from either platform is traveling with you, and Android phones can also scan for one on demand. Check bags, coats, and the car, including the wheel wells and under the seats. For a car or home you have reason to doubt, use a professional sweep.
Review sign-ins and trusted devices on your Apple, Google, and carrier accounts, change passwords and recovery details anyone else might know, and leave shared family plans you no longer control. Install updates promptly and remove apps you do not recognize. A clean spyware scan is not proof the phone is clean; if you suspect stalkerware, get specialist help.
This halts most GPS-based tracking, at the cost of maps, Find My, and some safety features; decide in advance which exceptions you need. The phone can still be located through cell towers, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, IP addresses, and malware.
Offline maps such as CoMaps, the community fork of Organic Maps, or OsmAnd send no route to a remote service. Download the area in advance. Google Maps and Apple Maps handle data differently, so judge them separately: Apple uses a temporary random identifier for each navigation session and blurs the starting point, while Google's history depends on your account settings.
Watches, speakers, TVs, and thermostats use and reveal your location, clustered around your home. Review and restrict each one. Your router can also put your home on Apple's and Google's location maps; FG-06 covers the opt-out.
Turn off location in each app and do not post photos with geographic clues or text that reveals where you are, especially in real time.
Clean up what you have spilled
Go through your accounts and remove photos that reveal your home, your routine, or your regular places, and posts with text that reveals where you were. Ask family and staff to do the same for posts that include you.
Review and clear stored location and voice history on each assistant and device.
Plate readers record your car on public roads, and facial recognition can place you without any device. Where you are offered a choice, take it: TSA lets travelers decline the face check at airport checkpoints and use a standard ID check instead. Limit clear, labeled photos of your face online. Hats, glasses, and "anti-recognition" clothing defeat some systems in some conditions and fail in others; treat none of it as dependable.
A spoofer feeds a fake coordinate to apps that read the GPS interface and do not detect mock locations, and those apps may pass the fake position on to ad networks. It cannot control tower, Wi-Fi, IP, carrier, or plate-reader positioning, is often detectable, and can break apps. Niche, not a substitute for the controls above.
What good looks like
No one you have not chosen can see where you are live. No tracker travels with you. Your accounts are yours alone. Brokers have been asked to delete what they hold, using every identifier you have. Your home address is hard to find and harder to confirm. What remains is real: your carrier, plate readers, cameras, and the people who see you. The aim is that no single record, and no single person, can find, confirm, and predict your movements on their own.
07 · The switches
What the switches actually do.
Every control in this guide does something specific and leaves something untouched. The table is the honest version of the settings screen.
| Switch | What it stops | What it does not stop |
|---|---|---|
| Ending location shares | Live location for the people you had shared it with. | Trackers, account access you do not know about, and anything already recorded. |
| Location Services off | GPS-based position reporting to apps and the operating system. | Tower, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth positioning; IP geolocation; the bidstream; plate readers; anything already collected. |
| App permission set to Never | That app's access to precise location. | Its access to your IP address and other identifiers; every other app; the operating system. |
| Advertising ID deleted or tracking off | The common key that joins your pings across apps and brokers, going forward. | Location and IP sent with ad requests; records already sold, unless you ask brokers to delete them using the old ID. |
| Airplane mode | Cellular transmission while on; Wi-Fi and Bluetooth only if you also switch them off in Settings. | GPS position worked out on the phone and stored by apps; the record before and after; anything upstream. |
| Auto-delete history | Indefinite accumulation on the platform. | Copies already exported, sold, or obtained by legal process; broker holdings. |
| A VPN | Your real IP address, as seen by the sites and apps you use. | GPS, radios, ad ID, apps that report position directly, accounts you sign in to, and the VPN provider's own view of you. |
| Broker opt-outs | Listings and, with the right requests, held location records. | New records from new feeds, and copies already passed on. A request is not proof of deletion. |
| A DROP request (California) | Holdings of every registered broker that can match you, re-applied every 45 days. | Unregistered brokers, copies already passed on, and records it cannot match to the identifiers you gave. |
Fig. 3 Every switch is worth flipping. None of them reaches the aggregated pattern brokers already hold, the sensors in public, or a person who already has access. That is why each tier has a cleanup column.
08 · Common beliefs
Common beliefs, checked.
"Location Services is off, so I am not being tracked."
One switch, one emitter. Shares, trackers, towers, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, IP address, the ad auction, your car, and your face all keep working. Central Command told Congress this year that disabling geolocation on commercial products does not always fully disable it.
"I turned off location history, so no one can see where I am."
Location sharing is a separate setting. Anyone you shared with, and anyone signed in to your account, may still see your live position.
"I reset my advertising ID every month, so I'm covered."
A reset cuts the link going forward. It also throws away the key to what was already sold. Copy the old ID before you change it, and use it in deletion requests.
"I deleted my history, so it is gone."
Gone from your phone. The brokers who bought it from the auction, and whoever bought it from them, still have it. Deletion on the device is step one of a much longer process.
"I never gave that app my location."
You gave it an ad request. Approximate location can ride along with it, and bidders in the auction can keep it, including the ones that lost.
"Airplane mode makes me invisible."
It cuts the cellular radio. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth may stay on unless you switch them off in Settings, the phone can still compute its position from GPS, and the records before and after still place you.
"The Supreme Court just fixed this."
It settled one thing: the government getting your Google Location History is a search, which ordinarily needs a warrant. It does not touch brokers, give you a right to sue one, or stop a single ad auction. What it does give you is a stronger answer when a broker says you agreed.
"A VPN hides my location."
It hides your IP address. Everything your phone reports by GPS, radio, and ad ID is unaffected, and the VPN provider now sees what your internet provider used to.
"I opted out of the data brokers last year."
Records come back as new feeds arrive. Outside California's DROP, opt-outs are maintenance on a schedule, not a one-time cleanup.
"If I leave the phone at home, I am location safe."
Leaving the phone handles the phone. Your car, your face, and a tracker in your bag are still on the move.
09 · The routine
The first 15 minutes, and the cadence that keeps it working.
- Check who can see your location: Safety Check on iPhone, Location Sharing in Google Maps, family and carrier apps.
- Take the advertising ID out of circulation, copying it first on Android (FG-09 has the steps).
- Audit location permissions: "Never" for anything that is not a map, "While Using" for maps.
- Turn off location tagging in the camera app.
- Turn on auto-delete for location history.
This month
- Delete stored Timeline and location history, including backups.
- Send deletion requests: DROP in California; broker opt-outs or an authorized agent elsewhere.
- Look up your car by VIN, turn off connected services you do not use, and ask the automaker to delete your data.
- Set a port-out PIN with your carrier.
Then, on a schedule
- Monthly: re-audit permissions on new apps, and review new photos and posts for location clues.
- After a system update or a new phone: confirm the ad ID and location shares are still as you left them.
- Quarterly: re-run opt-outs outside California and check what was actually removed; in California, check your DROP status and add new identifiers.
- After a move, a new job, a breakup, or a new threat: re-run the tier you are in.
The standard
Stop the leak and clean the spill, at the same time, at the tier your threat requires, on a schedule. Deletion is a routine, not a one-time cleanup. The pattern is the vulnerability.
10 · Sources
Sources and related reading.
Confidence is high that location data is collected, brokered, and resold at scale, and that device settings do not stop downstream flows. Confidence is moderate on any single vendor figure, each of which depends on the disclosure it came from. The plate-reader count is crowdsourced. Platform settings and map-app picks were checked in October 2026 and change.
Law and government
- Supreme Court of the United States, Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112, decided 29 June 2026 (case page). Acquiring Google Location History is a search; warrant questions remanded. Binding on government access; its reasoning on consent is persuasive, not binding, in commercial disputes.
- U.S. Central Command, unclassified responses to Senator Wyden, 14 April 2026, made public 28 May 2026 (Nextgov).
- Senator Wyden and Representative Harrigan, letter to the DoD Inspector General, 4 September 2026, and Reuters reporting the same day on the services disabling ad identifiers.
- California Privacy Protection Agency, Processing DROP requests (45-day cycles from 1 August 2026), and registry count, 2 June 2026.
- Federal Communications Commission, SIM-swap and port-out fraud rules (November 2023); compliance deadlines deferred by the Wireline Competition Bureau, 5 July 2024 (summary).
- TSA, facial comparison is voluntary; travelers who decline get standard ID verification.
Regulatory findings and consumer guidance
- FTC, complaint, In re Mobilewalla, January 2025. The 60 percent figure (consumer data from ad exchanges, 2018 to 2020), lost-bid retention, and the advertising-ID count.
- FTC, final order against Gravy Analytics and Venntel, January 2025, and the X-Mode / Outlogic order, April 2024.
- FTC, final order against General Motors and OnStar, 14 January 2026: five-year ban on disclosing location and driving data to consumer reporting agencies, consent for connected-vehicle data, and a way to request a copy and deletion.
- FTC, Stalkerware: What To Know. Why removing monitoring can tip off an abuser, and safety planning first.
Platforms and tools
- Apple, Safety Check in the Personal Safety User Guide, and If an app asks to track your activity.
- Apple, Apple Maps & Privacy: per-session random identifiers and less-exact locations within 24 hours.
- Google, Manage your Timeline data (Location Sharing is unaffected when Timeline is off) and Timeline on your device, with the 3, 18, or 36 month auto-delete.
- Apple and Google, cross-platform unwanted tracking alerts, May 2024.
- CoMaps, the community fork of Organic Maps launched in 2025 (It's FOSS), and OsmAnd.
- Flock Safety camera counts: SlashGear, 29 August 2026, on why the number is hard to know.
ObscureIQ research
- CB-141, Location data after Chatrie: the consent story just got weaker, and CB-142, Chatrie reprices the purchase route (both July 2026, revised September 2026).
- OG-100, Be Location Safe (July 2026), which this guide supersedes.
- Location Data Broker Atlas and CODEX: record coverage and invasiveness ratings for the brokers the cleanup columns target.
This edition supersedes OG-100 and the September 2026 edition of this guide. Revised 26 October 2026.
Not sure who could find you, or how?
Settings stop tomorrow's leaks. They do not reach the movement record brokers already hold, or tell you which path a specific person would use. ObscureIQ maps what brokers, vehicles, accounts, and devices still reveal about a person, closes the paths that matter for their actual threat, and watches for them reopening.