Field Guide 11 · Households, offices and the people around them
Who can reach you,
and should they?
Access to a principal accumulates quietly. A driver holds the whole calendar, an advisor keeps a gate code, a former assistant still has a delegated inbox. This guide is a review method for households and offices: decide what each relationship should reach, limit it to that, and know what to do when something feels wrong.
Contents
01 · Where we stand
Trust explains who gets close. Access is a separate decision.
Intelligence services, fraudulent hires, scam networks and rogue insiders reach people the same broad way: through trusted access or apparent legitimacy. They differ in method, as Command Brief CB-310 documents across cases from many countries. What they share is a weak point, access granted, expanded or misused on the strength of trust that nobody verified, bounded or supervised.
The most common form is trust earned in one role carried into another. A customer has a good reason to meet you; that reason does not extend to your travel plans or your household. A new hire passes identity checks and still reaches rooms and systems the job never required. Nobody decided to grant that access. It accumulated.
What this guide is for, and what it is not
This is a method for reviewing access. It leaves people alone by default. Friends and partners appear in it only for the access they hold, such as a house key or a shared calendar, and the review is of that access. Investigating a person is reserved for a specific, credible concern, handled by professionals, with the principal's agreement wherever the law allows.
A relationship explains why someone is trusted. It should not decide what they can reach.
02 · Start here
The fifteen-minute review.
Without an office or a chief of staff, start with the access that matters most. This version covers five points of entry and gets useful results in one sitting. The full method in sections 04 through 09 can follow.
- Step 1
Name the five entry points
Your home's entry codes and keys, your phone and email, money movement, your calendar and travel, and your children's schedules.
- Step 2
List who else holds each
Staff, assistants, drivers, advisors, contractors, friends and former employees. Include shared household access too, such as family location sharing or a joint alarm app; the review covers the permission, and the relationship stays your own business.
- Step 3
Test each one
For staff and service providers: would a stranger hired into the same role get this access? For friends and family: is it still needed, and is it still what you want? Mark anything that fails for review.
- Step 4
Trim one thing today
Change a code, remove a delegate, narrow a shared calendar to the trips a driver actually needs.
- Step 5
Name your confidential contact
Decide now who you would call if a relationship started to worry you, and who you would call if that person were the concern.
03 · First, a warning
Protect the review itself.
A completed access review is a map of who can reach your home, accounts, money and family. In the wrong hands it reads as a plan of approach. Treat it as one of the most sensitive documents the household holds.
Handling rules for the inventory
- Collect the minimum. Record access, purpose and dates. Leave out intimate details and family information the review does not need.
- No live secrets. Never write passwords, codes or account numbers into the inventory; record that a code exists and who holds it.
- Restricted storage. Keep it in a protected location with named readers, never an ordinary shared spreadsheet or a general team drive.
- Keep it out of outside tools. Do not upload a completed inventory to an unapproved AI service, assessment tool or vendor portal.
- Set retention. Decide how long old versions are kept, and delete them on schedule.
04 · The full method
The access inventory.
The inventory lists consequential access: anything that reaches the principal's home, systems, money, travel, confidential information or family. Work through the six surfaces below. Record one entry per access relationship, so a person who holds two kinds of access with different purposes gets two entries. Review the inventory quarterly, and after any new role, deal or departure.
Residence
Keys, codes, gate and guest lists, alarm and camera accounts, deliveries, household staff and vendors.
Calendar and travel
Itineraries, booking accounts, assistants' inboxes, drivers, aviation and hotel contacts.
Devices and accounts
Delegated email, shared logins, family tech help, anyone who has held your phone or laptop.
Confidential information
Deal documents, board materials, financial statements, legal, health and estate files.
Decisions and money
Payment authority, signatories, introductions made in your name, investment access.
Family
Children's schedules and schools, caregivers, anyone your family's routine is shared with.
Fig. 2 The six surfaces. Systems are one surface of six; the household holds the rest.
ACCESS ENTRY Person or provider, and role: What they can reach (one asset or information set): Access type: revocable / disclosed knowledge / authority or influence Criticality: high / medium / low Purpose it serves, and who authorized it: Verification completed, by whom, and when: Accountable owner (who can change or revoke it): Review or expiration date: Action required, and completion date: Change verified? (how, by whom): Status: retained / reduced / revoked / pending Residual exposure after the change:
05 · The test
Three questions for every entry.
Access
Is each item necessary for the stated purpose? Would a stranger in the same role receive it? Has it grown since it was granted, and did anyone approve the growth?
Credibility
Have identity, role and authority been verified to the level the access warrants, through channels you sourced yourself?
Behavior
Are the person's requests, privileges and any demands for secrecy consistent with the stated purpose?
| Professional or service relationship | Personal relationship |
|---|---|
| Would someone performing the same duties need this access? | Does this person still need this access, and do you want them to have it? |
| Is the access limited to those duties? | Is the arrangement deliberate, understood and safe? |
| Who approved it, and when does it expire? | Should any of it be narrowed or withdrawn? |
Fig. 3 Two versions of the test. The first is the stranger test: would a stranger hired into the same role receive the same access? A failed answer flags the access for review. The second leaves personal relationships to the principal, who decides deliberately.
Trust can justify granting access. It should never substitute for deciding what access is appropriate.
Speed is a weak signal on its own. Good advisors gain access quickly, and patient adversaries build credibility over years. Nationality and ethnicity establish nothing about a person's intent. What can matter is conduct, a documented institutional affiliation relevant to the access, such as an employer that is itself a state security body, and specific threat context. The actors who exploit trust recruit from every background, and suspicion keyed to origin misses most of them while harming people who have done nothing.
06 · Controls
Three control tracks, used independently.
The controls run on three separate tracks. Each track stands on its own: a new housekeeper needs screening before receiving a key whether or not anyone is concerned, and a long-serving advisor may need an access reduction and nothing else. Most of the protective work happens on the first track.
Routine access management
- Applies to every entry in the inventory.
- Grant access to the purpose, and no further.
- Set a review or expiration date at the moment of granting.
- Revoke on the day a role or relationship ends.
- Owner: the principal, chief of staff or family office.
Role verification
- Before sensitive access is granted, or when identity or authority changes.
- Confirm employer and role through contact details you find yourself, never ones the person supplies.
- Check licenses and corporate registries for advisors and counterparties.
- Screen household staff and contractors with written consent, following the legal notes below.
Concern-driven response
- Only on a specific, credible concern (section 08).
- Protect first: limit access while the concern is assessed.
- Assessment by qualified security or legal personnel, with a licensed investigator where the work requires one or the law demands it. Every finding graded before anyone acts.
- For friends and partners, only with the principal's agreement, except where safety or law requires otherwise.
Legal ground rules
When an employer obtains a background report from a consumer reporting agency for employment purposes, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires a standalone disclosure and written authorization first. If the report contributes to an adverse employment decision, a pre-adverse action notice with a copy of the report and a summary of rights comes before the decision, and an adverse action notice after it. State and local rules add more. Obtaining customer information from a financial institution by false pretenses is a federal crime, recording laws vary by state, and no track involves accessing another person's devices or accounts. Confirm specifics with counsel.
07 · Residual exposure
After a change: what remains.
Revocation closes a permission. It does not always close the exposure. Every completed change needs a second look at what the person still knows or can still influence.
Before changing access for a partner, former partner or household member
Confirm both the legal position and the safety implications first. Sudden changes to shared devices, smart-home systems or entry codes can alert a controlling person or trigger retaliation. If coercion, threats or abuse are possible, build a safety plan with a specialist before changing anything; the National Domestic Violence Hotline covers connected-home technology in its safety planning. Never use access controls to unlawfully exclude someone from a residence they are entitled to occupy.
| Access type | Example | What protection can do |
|---|---|---|
| Revocable privilege | Gate code, account delegation, shared calendar, payment permission | Remove it, rotate the credential, and verify the change actually took. |
| Disclosed knowledge | Home address, children's school, recurring travel pattern | Stop further disclosure, change the practice where practical, reduce the public copies, and assess what the person could do with what they know. |
| Formal authority | Bank signatory, power of attorney, payment approval | Give written notice to every institution that relies on it, follow any legal procedure, require second approval for money, and confirm instructions by callback to a known number. |
| Informal influence | Introductions, credibility with staff, acting in your name | Tell the people who act on it that the relationship has changed, and route requests in the person's name through verification. |
Fig. 4 The second row is the one reviews most often skip. Knowledge cannot be revoked; it can only be contained.
On the day a staff or service role ends
- Change entry codes and recover keys and fobs.
- Remove guest, gate and visitor list entries.
- Remove delegated email, calendar and shared-drive access, and check for active sessions, forwarding rules, connected apps and recovery emails or phone numbers that still point to the person.
- Withdraw payment and signing authority.
- Record the date in the inventory.
Afterward
- Confirm each removal worked: by a second person where the office has one, or through the account owner's own settings or a provider contact you sourced yourself.
- List what the person still knows or holds in copies, and change what is practical: vary routes, tighten who hears travel plans, limit further sharing of school details.
- Brief staff who might receive a request in the person's name.
- Treat a relationship that ended badly as the time access matters most.
08 · Escalation
When something feels wrong.
Escalation starts from conduct and conditions, never from who a person is. These conditions justify a closer look: access sought beyond the role; requests to keep contact or requests from staff, counsel or family; an identity or credential that cannot be confirmed through channels you sourced; unusual or urgent requests for money or introductions; pressure, guilt or threats after a refusal; and a specific concern raised by someone close, with facts behind it.
The right response depends on severity.
| Condition | Response |
|---|---|
| Routine discrepancy | Ask a direct, ordinary question, verify the role, and adjust access. Clarifying is normal management. |
| Credible suspicious behavior | Restrict the relevant access, preserve what you already have, and contact your confidential channel. |
| Threat, coercion or an immediate safety concern | Follow your safety plan, involve security professionals or emergency services, and avoid confrontation. |
Fig. 5 Triage by severity. The middle row is where most real concerns sit.
Preserve
- Keep existing messages, emails, call logs and voicemails.
- Write down dates, times and what was asked.
- Note who else witnessed or received requests.
Leave to professionals
- Searching anyone's belongings, devices or accounts.
- Recording people, or setting up a test to catch them.
- Confronting someone who may be dangerous.
09 · The channel
The confidential channel.
A principal needs somewhere to raise a concern about a relationship without automatically surrendering control of their personal life. The channel works only if it exists before it is needed, with terms the principal has read.
Set the terms in advance
- Who receives a concern, and an independent backup for when the designated contact is part of the concern.
- Who can see the records, how long they are kept, and where.
- When information may be shared beyond the channel, and with whom.
- When action can proceed without consent: typically imminent risk of harm, child safety, and legal or employment duties. Counsel should state these for the household's own circumstances.
If your phone, email or shared accounts might be monitored by the person you are worried about, reach your contact from a device and account that person cannot access. Routing records through counsel does not by itself make them privileged. Counsel should set up the privilege, confidentiality and records-handling arrangements deliberately.
CONFIDENTIAL CHANNEL Your contact: Independent backup (if your contact is part of the concern): How to reach them (from a device the person of concern cannot access): WHEN TO CALL A relationship worries you, even without proof. Someone asked for access, secrecy or money outside their role. You shared something you now regret sharing. WHAT HAPPENS We listen and record only what is needed. We advise on limiting access first. Further action normally needs your agreement. The exceptions are set out in your channel terms: imminent harm, child safety, and legal duties. WHAT TO BRING Dates, what was asked, and any messages you already have. Do not confront the person or go looking for evidence.
10 · Worked examples
Three reviews, start to finish.
Household · driver
The driver with the whole calendar
Found: a driver hired two years ago holds full access to the principal's calendar, granted when an assistant was on leave and never narrowed.
Test: a stranger hired as a driver would receive pickup times and addresses. Board meetings, medical appointments and family plans sit outside the role. Fails.
Action: calendar access removed; trips shared through a separate itinerary feed. A second person confirmed the old permission is gone. Residual: the driver knows the home, the office and recurring routes. Routes that matter are varied where practical.
Business · counterparty
The counterparty who became a friend
Found: an executive at a supplier, met through the business, has become a genuine friend: personal number, dinners at the home, conversation about travel.
Test: the friendship is the principal's own business, and the principal decides what personal information to share. The professional boundary is separate: friendship and supplier status confer no access to confidential deal information, staff instructions, restricted itineraries or decisions. The executive's role is confirmed through the supplier's main switchboard.
Action: deal information moves through formal channels only, and staff are told that requests from the supplier follow normal approvals. No investigation; nothing in the conduct meets section 08. Residual: the home address is known, and noted in the inventory.
Personal · shared access
The partner with the alarm account
Found: a relationship that has since ended left a former partner with the alarm app and a garage code.
Test: the principal no longer wants the access to continue. The relationship itself is not under review. The first question is safety: was the relationship ever coercive or threatening, and does the person have any legal right to the residence?
Action, where the ending was amicable: app access removed and the code changed, confirmed through the alarm provider. Where there is any history of coercion: a safety plan comes first, with a specialist, and changes are timed within it. Residual: the person knows the home and the household's routine. If pressure or threats follow, section 08's third row applies.
11 · Common beliefs
Common beliefs, checked.
"Background checks solve this."
Screening covers people at hiring. Access can keep accumulating afterward, through favors, cover for absences and relationships that grow. The inventory catches what screening cannot.
"We know these people. They are fine."
Almost everyone with access is fine. The review asks whether the access fits the role, which protects good people too: an assistant with fewer permissions is a less attractive target for someone else.
"Revoking access ends the exposure."
It ends the permission. What the person knows stays with them, which is why section 07 asks what remains after every change.
"Watch out for people who get close fast."
Speed is a weak signal. Requests, secrecy and access that outrun the role are stronger ones.
"Be wary of people from certain countries."
The actors who exploit trust recruit across every background. Judging origin harms innocent people and misses most real approaches. Judge conduct and access.
"If something seems off, look into it quietly yourself."
Self-directed investigation can put you at risk, spoil evidence and create legal exposure. Preserve what you have and use the channel.
12 · The one-minute version
Inventory, test, trim, verify, prepare.
- List who outside the household can reach your home, accounts, money, travel and family.
- For staff and providers, ask whether a stranger in the same role would get the same access. For friends and family, decide deliberately what you want them to hold.
- Trim what fails, set a review date for what stays, and revoke on the day a role ends.
- Confirm identities and every request for money through contact details you source yourself.
- After every change, check for leftover paths (sessions, forwarding, recovery details) and ask what the person still knows.
- Name a confidential contact and an independent backup before you need them.
- Keep the inventory itself restricted, minimal and free of live codes.
13 · Sources
Sources and related reading.
Reviewed November 2026. The method is an ObscureIQ field instrument built on established practice; the control tracks, triggers and worksheet are ours and should be attributed as such. Nothing here is legal advice; screening, recording and records law vary by state and country.
Law and guidance
- Federal Trade Commission and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Background Checks: What Employers Need to Know: disclosure, authorization, and pre-adverse and adverse action notices under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
- Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681 et seq.
- Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §6821: obtaining customer financial information by false pretenses.
Established practice
- NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5, Security and Privacy Controls: AC-2, Account Management, and AC-6, Least Privilege, the system-world versions of the review and trim steps applied here to a household.
ObscureIQ research
- CB-310, The access is a person: approaches that arrive as relationships (November 2026): the four pathways, the access boundary, and the record behind this guide.
- CB-246, The validation gate: why no finding about a named person should be acted on until it is graded.
Every household's access map is different, and so is who might use it.
The method here is built to be run by your own office. Where a concern needs professional assessment, we provide analyst-led investigation, coordinated with counsel where the matter calls for it. Where knowledge can no longer be taken back, we reduce the public copies that make a principal easy to find and approach.