Northbridge Ferry Systems Data Breach
A regional passenger ferry operator running commuter and vehicle services across three coastal counties, with a ticketing app that holds rider identity, payment and sailing history.
Recent, circulating, and valuable to buyers.
What this number measures
The Index rates how dangerous a breach is right now rather than how large it was. It values each exposed field on its own, ages each one according to what that field is, and models what the assembled set lets an attacker do. That is why an old breach of millions of addresses can score below a recent breach of a few thousand complete identities.
It is read against what is observed circulating, not what was announced. Bands: 61 and above high, 31 to 60 moderate, below 31 low.
Every score carries a status. Observed means it is scored on fields seen circulating. Observed minimum means at least that much was seen, so read it as a floor. Provisional means the circulating fields are not yet confirmed. How sure we are of the evidence is shown separately, and it never lowers the score. How the Index works →
Includes data that cannot be reissued or taken back. A changed password does not reach any of it.
- Circulating
- 412,000 account rows
- Field types
- 14 seen · 8 in the notice
- Breach date
- 2026-03-14
- Observed circulating
- 2026-04-02
- Attributed
- Rowhammer Collective · moderate confidence
- Vector
- Credential stuffing into a vendor admin console
- Evidence
- High · Circulating sample examined
BreachOperator confirms incidentNotice filed · State AGSeen circulating · scored
What data was exposed
How this data can be used against you
Identity
Name, date of birth and a government ID number, together.
Physical targeting
A home address beside a dependable schedule of absences.
Social engineering
Direct contact details plus real trips to cite.
Account access
Hashed passwords only. Useful once cracked, and they expire.
Financial
Last four card digits only. Not a usable card.
Coercion
Records on children, linked to the household.
Health
Reported in the notice, not seen circulating.
Crypto
Nothing in the set.
Three key actions to take
Treat the address and the sailing history as one fact
The pairing is what matters. A home address is ordinary; a home address beside two years of departure times says when the house is empty.
Put a port-out PIN on your mobile account
Phone number and identity in the same row is the raw material for a SIM swap, and the carrier will add the PIN in a five minute call.
Expect contact that already knows your travel
Refund and rebooking approaches are the obvious follow-on. Anyone citing a real past sailing is reading this data, not remembering you.
Check whether you were affected
Most people in a breach like this do not need an engagement. They need to know whether their address is in it, and when it turns up somewhere new. HackNotice does both, free: an Instant Check now, alerts after. It is one of the sources behind the record you just read.
Talk to us about your exposure
If you are exposed in a way that cannot be rotated away, or you are responsible for someone who is, a call establishes what is actually reachable about you and what is worth doing first. No charge for the conversation.
Request a confidential call →The full breach analysis
What happened, what the company reported against what is circulating, the field-by-field record, the actor and the advisory.
- What happened
- Recent developments
- Reported and circulating
- Data points exposed
- Downstream risk
- Principal risk advisory
- Threat actor
- Background
- Data context
- Next steps
How this breach happened
An attacker reused credentials harvested from an unrelated breach to reach the administrative console of Northbridge's ticketing vendor, and from there exported the rider table in full. The export covered every account created since the app launched, including accounts closed years earlier, because the vendor retained closed records against a future reconciliation that never happened.
What has happened since the breach
The operator confirmed an incident on 2026-03-21 and said a third-party investigation was under way. The dataset was observed in open circulation on 2026-04-02, which is the date this record is scored against rather than the date of the announcement.
What was reported vs. what is circulating
Reported
- Filed with
- State attorney general
- Date
- 2026-03-28
- Affected
- 388,400 people
- Fields named
- 8full name, email address, phone number, date of birth, government ID number, home address, payment card (last four), disability documentation
Circulating
- First seen
- 2026-04-02
- Breach date
- 2026-03-14
- Volume
- 412,000 account rows
- Fields seen
- 14full name, email address, phone number, date of birth, government ID number, home address, payment card (last four), account password (hashed), vehicle registration, sailing history (two years), dependent records, purchase history, login and activity history, support records
7 fields: account password (hashed), vehicle registration, sailing history (two years), dependent records, purchase history, login and activity history, support records.
1 field: disability documentation.
The notice also names disability documentation submitted for concession fares. It has not been seen circulating. If it surfaces, this record would score higher.
Counts are not compared: the notice counts people, the dataset counts account rows. The score is built only on what is seen circulating.
Every exposed field, and how long it stays useful
Fourteen field types are present. Five of them cannot be reissued: government identity number, date of birth, the residential address, the vehicle registration and the dependent records attached to family accounts. The remaining nine are rotatable in principle, though the sailing history is not meaningfully rotatable in practice because it is a record of what already happened.
| Field | Shelf life | In notice | Circulating |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full name | Lasts for years | Yes | Yes |
| Email address | Lasts for years | Yes | Yes |
| Phone number | Lasts for years | Yes | Yes |
| Date of birth | Lasts for years | Yes | Yes |
| Government ID number | Lasts for years | Yes | Yes |
| Home address | Lasts for years | Yes | Yes |
| Payment card (last four) | Fades over months | Yes | Yes |
| Account password (hashed) | Expires fast | No | Yes |
| Vehicle registration | Lasts for years | No | Yes |
| Sailing history (two years) | Fades over months | No | Yes |
| Dependent records | Lasts for years | No | Yes |
| Purchase history | Fades over months | No | Yes |
| Login and activity history | Expires fast | No | Yes |
| Support records | Fades over months | No | Yes |
| Disability documentation | Lasts for years | Yes | Not seen |
Shelf life is how long a field stays useful to someone holding it. A password expires fast. A government ID number or a date of birth lasts for years. An address stays useful long after it stops being current.
How attackers can use this data
Identity proofing is the first use. The combination clears most knowledge-based verification without any further research, because it carries the name, the date of birth, the address and a document number together.
Physical targeting is the second and the reason this record scores where it does. A named individual, a residential address and a dependable schedule of absences is a different category of exposure from a credential dump, and it is not addressed by anything a consumer can rotate.
Risks for executives and other high-profile people
For a protected person, the exposure of concern is not fraud. It is that a two-year movement pattern against a residential address supports surveillance planning by someone who has never been near either.
Where a principal's household or staff hold accounts on the same service, treat those as in scope. The pattern that matters is frequently the assistant's, not the principal's.
Who is behind this breach
Attributed to the Rowhammer Collective on the basis of the posting account and the tooling, at moderate confidence. The group has no established record of fabricating victims, but attribution here rests on tradecraft rather than on an admission, and the volume figure originates with the actor.
About the company
Northbridge runs scheduled commuter and vehicle services across three coastal counties on a fleet of nine vessels, carrying roughly 2.4 million passenger journeys a year. Ticketing moved to a single app in 2019, and the app became the only route to a discounted fare, which is why the account base is close to the whole regular ridership rather than a subset of it.
Why the company holds this data
A ferry ticket is a reservation for a named person on a dated sailing, and a vehicle ticket adds a registration plate and a vehicle length. Concession fares require proof of age, residence or disability, which is why government identity documents sit in the same table as the payment card.
None of this is unusual for a transport operator. It is the reason the combination is unusually rich: identity, payment, residence and a two-year pattern of movement, assembled by the ordinary operation of a ticketing app.
How ObscureIQ can help
Confirmation against the corpus, so you know whether your own data is in the set rather than whether the set exists. Exposure mapping and removal across the brokers that will ingest it. Monitoring tuned to the fields this breach actually exposed, rather than to the company's name.