Company · Transportation and marine passenger services · Regional commuter ferry operator · USA

Northbridge Ferry Systems Data Breach

A regional passenger ferry operator running commuter and vehicle services across three coastal counties, with a ticketing app that holds rider identity, payment and sailing history.

Specimen record · not a real operator
Breach Risk Index
74/100 High
0 · lower riskhigher risk · 100
ObservedScored on fields seen circulating · BRI 2.0 · 2026-04-02

Recent, circulating, and valuable to buyers.

What this number measures

The Index rates how dangerous a breach is right now rather than how large it was. It values each exposed field on its own, ages each one according to what that field is, and models what the assembled set lets an attacker do. That is why an old breach of millions of addresses can score below a recent breach of a few thousand complete identities.

It is read against what is observed circulating, not what was announced. Bands: 61 and above high, 31 to 60 moderate, below 31 low.

Every score carries a status. Observed means it is scored on fields seen circulating. Observed minimum means at least that much was seen, so read it as a floor. Provisional means the circulating fields are not yet confirmed. How sure we are of the evidence is shown separately, and it never lowers the score. How the Index works →

Data sensitivity
Restricted

Includes data that cannot be reissued or taken back. A changed password does not reach any of it.

Circulating
412,000 account rows
Field types
14 seen · 8 in the notice
Breach date
2026-03-14
Observed circulating
2026-04-02
Attributed
Rowhammer Collective · moderate confidence
Vector
Credential stuffing into a vendor admin console
Evidence
High · Circulating sample examined
Corpus sources include HackNotice
How it unfolded19 days from breach to circulation
  1. Breach
  2. Operator confirms incident
  3. Notice filed · State AG
  4. Seen circulating · scored
What came out

What data was exposed

Dependent recordsData on childrenNot in the notice
Date of birthCannot be reissued
Government ID numberCannot be reissued
Home addressWhere you sleep
Vehicle registrationWhere you goNot in the notice
Sailing history (two years)Where you goNot in the notice
Payment card (last four)Financial
Full nameIdentity
Email addressContact
Phone numberContact
Account password (hashed)CredentialsNot in the notice
Purchase historyNotable exposureNot in the notice
Login and activity historyNotable exposureNot in the notice
Support recordsNotable exposureNot in the notice
Red cannot be reissued or taken back · Blue is the residence · Black is movement, where you go rather than where you live · Grey is high-signal data that is not standard breach material · Flagged fields are circulating but missing from the company's notice
What it enables

How this data can be used against you

Enabled

Identity

Name, date of birth and a government ID number, together.

Enabled

Physical targeting

A home address beside a dependable schedule of absences.

Enabled

Social engineering

Direct contact details plus real trips to cite.

Partial

Account access

Hashed passwords only. Useful once cracked, and they expire.

Partial

Financial

Last four card digits only. Not a usable card.

Partial

Coercion

Records on children, linked to the household.

Not enabled

Health

Reported in the notice, not seen circulating.

Not enabled

Crypto

Nothing in the set.

Enabled: the set on its own is enough · Partial: part of what is needed, or weakened · Not enabled: nothing usable in what circulates
What you should do

Three key actions to take

Treat the address and the sailing history as one fact

The pairing is what matters. A home address is ordinary; a home address beside two years of departure times says when the house is empty.

Put a port-out PIN on your mobile account

Phone number and identity in the same row is the raw material for a SIM swap, and the carrier will add the PIN in a five minute call.

Expect contact that already knows your travel

Refund and rebooking approaches are the obvious follow-on. Anyone citing a real past sailing is reading this data, not remembering you.

Check it yourself

Check whether you were affected

Most people in a breach like this do not need an engagement. They need to know whether their address is in it, and when it turns up somewhere new. HackNotice does both, free: an Instant Check now, alerts after. It is one of the sources behind the record you just read.

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If this matters to you

Talk to us about your exposure

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Full record · 10 sections

The full breach analysis

What happened, what the company reported against what is circulating, the field-by-field record, the actor and the advisory.

  • What happened
  • Recent developments
  • Reported and circulating
  • Data points exposed
  • Downstream risk
  • Principal risk advisory
  • Threat actor
  • Background
  • Data context
  • Next steps
No sign-in · nothing is recorded
What happened

How this breach happened

An attacker reused credentials harvested from an unrelated breach to reach the administrative console of Northbridge's ticketing vendor, and from there exported the rider table in full. The export covered every account created since the app launched, including accounts closed years earlier, because the vendor retained closed records against a future reconciliation that never happened.

Recent developments

What has happened since the breach

The operator confirmed an incident on 2026-03-21 and said a third-party investigation was under way. The dataset was observed in open circulation on 2026-04-02, which is the date this record is scored against rather than the date of the announcement.

Reported and circulating

What was reported vs. what is circulating

The company's notice

Reported

Filed with
State attorney general
Date
2026-03-28
Affected
388,400 people
Fields named
8full name, email address, phone number, date of birth, government ID number, home address, payment card (last four), disability documentation
Observed by ObscureIQ

Circulating

First seen
2026-04-02
Breach date
2026-03-14
Volume
412,000 account rows
Fields seen
14full name, email address, phone number, date of birth, government ID number, home address, payment card (last four), account password (hashed), vehicle registration, sailing history (two years), dependent records, purchase history, login and activity history, support records
Circulating, not in the notice

7 fields: account password (hashed), vehicle registration, sailing history (two years), dependent records, purchase history, login and activity history, support records.

In the notice, not seen circulating

1 field: disability documentation.

Potential scope · Higher, within High

The notice also names disability documentation submitted for concession fares. It has not been seen circulating. If it surfaces, this record would score higher.

Counts are not compared: the notice counts people, the dataset counts account rows. The score is built only on what is seen circulating.

Data points exposed

Every exposed field, and how long it stays useful

Fourteen field types are present. Five of them cannot be reissued: government identity number, date of birth, the residential address, the vehicle registration and the dependent records attached to family accounts. The remaining nine are rotatable in principle, though the sailing history is not meaningfully rotatable in practice because it is a record of what already happened.

FieldShelf lifeIn noticeCirculating
Full nameLasts for yearsYesYes
Email addressLasts for yearsYesYes
Phone numberLasts for yearsYesYes
Date of birthLasts for yearsYesYes
Government ID numberLasts for yearsYesYes
Home addressLasts for yearsYesYes
Payment card (last four)Fades over monthsYesYes
Account password (hashed)Expires fastNoYes
Vehicle registrationLasts for yearsNoYes
Sailing history (two years)Fades over monthsNoYes
Dependent recordsLasts for yearsNoYes
Purchase historyFades over monthsNoYes
Login and activity historyExpires fastNoYes
Support recordsFades over monthsNoYes
Disability documentationLasts for yearsYesNot seen

Shelf life is how long a field stays useful to someone holding it. A password expires fast. A government ID number or a date of birth lasts for years. An address stays useful long after it stops being current.

Downstream risk

How attackers can use this data

Identity proofing is the first use. The combination clears most knowledge-based verification without any further research, because it carries the name, the date of birth, the address and a document number together.

Physical targeting is the second and the reason this record scores where it does. A named individual, a residential address and a dependable schedule of absences is a different category of exposure from a credential dump, and it is not addressed by anything a consumer can rotate.

Principal risk advisory

Risks for executives and other high-profile people

For a protected person, the exposure of concern is not fraud. It is that a two-year movement pattern against a residential address supports surveillance planning by someone who has never been near either.

Where a principal's household or staff hold accounts on the same service, treat those as in scope. The pattern that matters is frequently the assistant's, not the principal's.

Threat actor

Who is behind this breach

Attributed to the Rowhammer Collective on the basis of the posting account and the tooling, at moderate confidence. The group has no established record of fabricating victims, but attribution here rests on tradecraft rather than on an admission, and the volume figure originates with the actor.

Background

About the company

Northbridge runs scheduled commuter and vehicle services across three coastal counties on a fleet of nine vessels, carrying roughly 2.4 million passenger journeys a year. Ticketing moved to a single app in 2019, and the app became the only route to a discounted fare, which is why the account base is close to the whole regular ridership rather than a subset of it.

Data context

Why the company holds this data

A ferry ticket is a reservation for a named person on a dated sailing, and a vehicle ticket adds a registration plate and a vehicle length. Concession fares require proof of age, residence or disability, which is why government identity documents sit in the same table as the payment card.

None of this is unusual for a transport operator. It is the reason the combination is unusually rich: identity, payment, residence and a two-year pattern of movement, assembled by the ordinary operation of a ticketing app.

Next steps

How ObscureIQ can help

Confirmation against the corpus, so you know whether your own data is in the set rather than whether the set exists. Exposure mapping and removal across the brokers that will ingest it. Monitoring tuned to the fields this breach actually exposed, rather than to the company's name.

Rowhammer CollectiveCredential stuffingTransportationPassenger transitBroad geo-locationDirect customers2026
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